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THE ROLE OF THE COURT OF THE EUROPEAN
COAMUNITIES IN THE ANTITRUST STRUCTURE
OF THE COMMON MARETt
ERNEST WOLF*

T~mlE Treaty of Paris' establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, signed on April 18, 1951 by the six Member countries,2
instituted four community organs: a High Authority, a Common Assembly, a Special Council of Ministers and a Court of Justice. By the
Treaties of Rome, 3 signed by the same States on March 25, 1957, two
of these four organs, the Assembly and the Court of Justice, were
declared institutions common to all three European Communities: the
European Coal and Steel Community or ECSC, the European Economic
Community known as the EEC or Common Market, and the European
Atomic Energy Community, known as EURATOM.1
The seven judges and the two advocates-general,' who had formed
the Court of the European Coal and Steel Community at Luxembourg,
became judges and advocates-general respectively of the three European
Communities.' A new executive organ of the EEC was set up at Brussels,
the Commission, consisting of nine members who, like the members

*

This paper is taken from an address given at the Fourth Annual Institute Corporate
Counsel on The Antitrust Structure of the European Common Market held at the Fordham
University School of Law on December 6-7, 1962. The full proceedings of the Institute are
published by the Fordham University Press, 1963.
* Professor of Law, University of Basel, Switzerland.
1. Treaty of Paris, April 13, 1951, tit. 2, art. 7, 261 U.N.T.S. 149 [hereinafter cited
as ECSC Treaty].
2. The six Member States were: Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy,
Luxembourg and Netherlands.
3. Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, 293 U.N.T.S. 14, CCH Common Market Rep. g 111
(establishing the European Economic Community) [hereinafter cited as EEC Treaty];
Treaty of Rome, March 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 171 (establishing the European Atomic
Energy Community) [hereinafter cited as EURATOM Treaty].
4. Convention Relating to Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities,
March 25, 1957, 298 UM.T.S. 269, CCH Common Market Rep.
6461. This Convention
annulled and replaced Articles 21 and 32 of the ECSC Treaty, 261 U.N.T.S. 140.
S. The two advocates-general are a kind of permanent amid curiae who publicly state
at the end of debates their opinion on each case coming before the Court. The Convention
provides that the two advocates-general are "to present publicly, with complete impartiality and independence, reasoned conclusions on cases submitted to the Court, with a
view to assisting the latter in the performance of its duties... ." Convention Relating to
Certain Institutions Common to the European Communities, March 25, 1957, § 2, art.
4(2) (a), 298 U.N.T.S. 272, CCH Common Market Rep. 6461.
6. For a comprehensive treatise dealing with the Court (with extensive bibliography)
see Bebr, Judidal Control of the European Communities (1962).
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of the High Authority of Luxembourg, "shall perform their duties in the
general interest of the Community with complete independence."' The
Paris Treaty expressly describes the character of the functions of the
High Authority as "supranational." 8 The supranationality applies to
the organs of the EEC to an even greater extent than to those of the
ECSC. The so-called general decisions of the High Authority, occasionally
described by the Court as quasi-legislative acts,9 are directly binding on
the coal and steel enterprises which are defined by the nature of their
operations and are comparatively limited in number. On the other hand,
the regulations of the Council of the EEC, as well as the decisions of its
Commission, can concern an indefinite number of corporations and
individuals within the Common Market.1" The latter can also concern
enterprises outside the Market if they are involved in trade with Common
Market countries. The very fact that the decisions both of the High
Authority" and of the Council and Commission of the EEC12 and
EURATOM 13 are binding not only on Member States, but also on their
citizens, distinguishes the European Communities from other common
institutions established by treaties between different countries. The
same direct binding force applies to the decisions of the Court,14 and
Advocate-General Lagrange could therefore rightly say in the early
days of the existence of the European Coal and Steel Community that
"the Court is not an international jurisdiction, but rather a jurisdiction
of a community formed by six States, which is much more akin to a
Federation than to an international organization.", In conformity with
Articles 18710 and 19217 of the EEC Treaty, the Court's decisions are
7. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 3, art. 157(2), 298 U.N.T.S. 72, CCH Common
Market Rep. ff 6067.
8. ECSC Treaty, tit. 2, ch. 1, art. 9, 261 U.N.T.S. 151.
9. Nold v. Haute Autorit6, Cour de Justice de ]a C.E.C.A., March 20, 1959, 5 Rec. de
la jurisprudence de Ia Cour 89, 113.
10. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 2, art. 189, 298 U.N.T.S. 78-79, CCH Common Market
Rep. U 6175.
11. ECSC Treaty, tit. 2, ch. 1, art. 15, 261 U.N.T.S. 155, 157.
12. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 2, art. 192, 298 U.N.T.S. 79, CCH Common Market
Rep. UI6187.
13. EURATOM Treaty, tit. 3, ch. 2, art. 161, 298 U.N.T.S. 217.
14. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 187, 298 U.N.T.S. 78, CCH Common
Market Rep. ff 6164.
15. Fd6ration Charbonni~re de Belgique v. Haute Autorit6, Cour de Justice de la
C.E.C.A., July 16, 1956, 2 Rec. de la jurisprudence de ]a Cour 199, 263.
16. Article 187 provides that: "The judgment of the Court of Justice shall be enforceable
under the conditions laid down in Article 192." 298 U.N.T.S. 78, CCH Common Market
Rep. U6164.
17. Article 192 provides in part that: "Decisions of the Council or of the Commission
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enforceable against persons other than States. As regards States, article
171 provides that whenever the Court "finds that a Member State has
failed to fulfill any of its obligations under [the] ...Treaty, such State
shall take the measures required for the implementation of the judgment
of the Court."'
According to the Treaties of Paris and Rome, the function of the
Court of Justice is to "ensure observance of law and justice in the interpretation and application of [the] ...Treaty."'" As the Court is primarily
competent to interpret the Treaties and the regulations giving effect to
them it has multiple functions. In accordance with my subject, I shall limit
myself to a summary of the functions entrusted to the Court by the EEC
Treaty, and I shall only incidentally refer to the corresponding provisions of the Treaty of Paris and to Court decisions arising under it.
As the Assembly is limited for the most part only to consultative
functions under article 173, the main function of the Court is the control
of the lawfulness of the acts of the Council and the Commission.20
Secondly, under article 175, if the Council or Commission fails to act and
this failure constitutes a violation of the Treaty, redress may be had in
the Court.2 1 A third important function is the preliminary decision (a
titre prijudiciel) upon the request of a national court on questions concerning "(a) the interpretation of this Treaty; (b) the validity and
interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community; and (c) the
interpretation of the statutes of any bodies set up by an act of the
Council where such statutes so provide. 2 2
Before dealing in detail with these three functions which have an impact on the antitrust laws of the Common Market, I should mention
briefly those functions of the Court which do not directly concern our
subject.
which contain a pecuniary obligation on persons other than States shall be enforceable." 293
U.N.T.S. 79, CCH Common Market Rep. 61S7.
13. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 171, 293 U.N.T.S. 75, CCH Common
Market Rep. § 6111.
19. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 164, 293 UX.T.S. 73, CCH Common
Market Rep. f 60S5; EURATOM Treaty, tit. 3, ch. 1, § 4, art. 136, 293 UX.T.S. 212. The
ECSC Treaty adds the words "and of its implementing regulations." ECSC Treaty, fit. 2,
ch. 4, art. 31, 261 U.N.T.S. 165.
20. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 173, 293 UN.T.S. 75, CCH Common
Market Rep. ff 6117.
21. "In the event of the Council or the Commission in violation of this Treaty failing

to act, the Member States and the other institutions of the Community may refer the
matter to the Court of Justice with a view to establishing such violation." EEC Treaty,

pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 175, 293 U.N.T.S. 76, CCH Common Market Rep.

6124.

22. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 177, 293 U.N.T.S. 76-77, CCH Common
Market Rep. ff6131.
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While the aforementioned articles 17323 and 17524 provide a procedure
for actions by Member States against unlawful acts or failure to act by
the Council or Commission and by the Council against such acts of the
Commission and vice-versa, article 16921 gives to the Commission a right
to lodge an action with the Court against a State which in the opinion of
the Commission has failed to fulfill any of its obligations under the
Treaty. It is bound, before doing so, to invite the State concerned to
state its case. It may be added that the Court of Justice has in two
instances rendered a judgment under article 169 against a particular
State which complied on both occasions.2"
Article 17027 gives a similar right to any Member State to maintain an
action against another Member State for violation of the Treaty. However, in order to avoid unnecessary lawsuits between Member States, no
State may start proceedings against another Member State relating to an
alleged infringement of Treaty obligations until it has referred the
matter to the Commission. According to article 182,28 any other dispute
between Member States in connection with the objects of the Treaty
may be submitted by them to the Court by stipulation.
The Court of Justice is competent to decide controversies submitted
to it pursuant to any arbitration clause contained in a contract concluded
by the Community, which contract may be with individuals or corporations within or without the Common Market area, with Member States
or even with non-Member States. 29 The Court is also competent to render
23. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 173, 298 U.N.T.S. 75-76, CCH Common
Market Rep. U 6117.
24. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 175, 298 U.N.T.S. 76, CCH Common
Market Rep. IT6124.
25. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 169, 298 U.N.T.S. 75, CCH Common Market
Rep. IT6104.
26. Commission de ]a C.E.E. v. Gouvernement de ]a R~publlque Italienne, Cour dc
Justice de ]a C.E.C.A., Dec. 19, 1961, 7 Rec. de la jurisprudence de la Cour 633, CCH
Common Market Rep. IT8001; Commission de ]a C.E.E. v. Gouvernement de ]a Rpublique
Italienne, Cour de justice de la C.E.C.A., Feb. 27, 1962, 7 Rec. de ]a jurisprudence dc Ia
Cour 1, CCH Common Market Rep. IT8002.
27. "Any Member State which considers that another Member State has failed to
fulfill any of its obligations under this Treaty may refer the matter to the Court of Justice.
Before a Member State institutes, against another Member State, proceedings relating to
an alleged infringement of the obligations under this Treaty, it shall refer the matter to the
Commission." EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 170, 298 U.N.T.S. 75, CCH Common
Market Rep. IT6107.
28. "The Court of Justice shall be competent to decide in any dispute between Member
States in connection with the object of this Treaty, where such dispute is submitted to It
under the terms of a compromise." EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 182, 298
U.N.T.S. 78, CCH Common Market Rep. IT6147.
29. "The Court of Justice shall be competent to make a decision pursuant to any
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decisions upon complaints regarding tort liability of the Community
for any damage caused by its organs or by its employees in the
performance of their duties.30 The Court is further empowered by article
179 to decide controversies between the Community and its employees.3 1
The Council, the Commission or a Member State may ask the Court
for an advisory opinion on whether or not a proposed agreement of the
Community with one or more States or with an international body
is compatible with the provisions of the EEC Treaty. 2 Should the Court
conclude that the proposed agreement is not compatible with the Treaty,
such agreement cannot become valid unless the Treaty is amended in
accordance with article 236. 33
As previously mentioned, the main function of the Court is to control
the lawfulness of the acts of the Council and Commission. Article 173
also provides for judicial review of all acts which have legal relevance if
an action is lodged with the Court within a period of two months after
publication or notification of the act.34 The review of acts of the Council
may be initiated by the Commission and vice-versa.1 A petition may
also be lodged by any Member State, but private persons or corporations
may only address a petition to the Court against a decision of the Council
or Commission which concerns them directly and specifically.2° No
matter who initiates the review, it can only be based on one or more of
the four following grounds: (1) lack of jurisdiction; (2) disregard of
essential formalities; (3) infringement of the Treaty or of any rule of
law relating to its application; and (4) abuse of power.37 These are the
four classical grounds of judicial review developed by the French Council
of State which is the highest administrative court in France. However,
arbitration clause contained in a contract concluded, under public or private law, by or
on behalf of the Community." EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 131, 293 U.N.TS.
77, CCH Common Market Rep. f 6144.
30. Article 178 confers jurisdiction on the Court "to hear cases relating to compensation
for damage... ." EEC Treaty, pL 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 178, 293 UX.T.S. 77, CCH
Common Market Rep. [f 6134. In conjunction with article 173, noncontractual liability
is imposed on the Community for "damage caused by its institutions or by its employees... ." EEC Treaty, pt. 6, art. 215, 29S UN.T.S. S6-37, CCH Common Blarket Rep.
ff6313.
31. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 179, 293 UN.T.S. 77, CCH Common
Mlarket Rep. ff 6137.
32. EEC Treaty, pt. 6, art. 223, 29S U.N.T.S. 90, CCH Common Blarket Rep. E 6361.
33. EEC Treaty, pt. 6, art. 236, 29S U.N.T.S. 91, CCH Common Market Rep. E 6331.
34. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 173, 293 U LT.S. 75-76, CCH Common
Market Rep. U 6117.
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
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in France, judicial review is not possible against acts of the legislature.
Under the Treaty, legislative acts emanate from the Council and, in less
important cases, from the Commission. 8 They are called "Regulations"
because it was thought that this term would express their relationship to
the overriding Treaty. But in view of their content, the Regulations
issued by the Council should be regarded as statutes. The judicial review of Regulations can, therefore, be best compared to the control of
the constitutionality of legislative acts as it exists in the United States,
Germany and Italy. Unlike the United States practice, an abstract
petition for annulment of a legislative act may be made according to
article 173, but only by a Member State, the Council or the Commission.
An individual, however, will be in the same position as he would be in
the United States. According to article 184,40 he can claim in the course
of legal proceedings that the legislative act is invalid on any of the four
classical grounds. 4 '
As regards the first ground, lack of jurisdiction, the review of the Court
may in all instances-whether applied to legislative acts or to acts of an
administrative nature-be compared with the control of constitutionality
by United States Federal Courts. The Court will in the first place have
to decide whether the act of the Council or of the Commission was within
the competence of the Community as such. In other words, the Court
will have to determine the limitations of Community powers as against
the powers left to the Member States, both in the legislative and in the
administrative sphere. Only if the Court finds that the act, as such, falls
within the jurisdiction of the Community, may a decision, concerning
whether the Council or the Commission was competent, be made. For
both kinds of finding the Court will have to interpret the Treaty and will
be required to examine the facts of the case.
The second ground, namely the disregard of essential formalities, refers
(1) to the correct procedure in making a Regulation or reaching an
administrative decision, and (2) to the way in which the decision reached
has been formulated:
A. As regards procedure, the Council often needs a particular majority
38. EEC Treaty,
Rep. fI6175.
39. EEC Treaty,
Market Rep. ff 6117.
40. EEC Treaty,
Market Rep. fI6154.
41. EEC Treaty,
Market Rep. g 6117.

pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 2, art. 189, 298 U.N.T.S. 78-79, CCH Common Market
pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 173, 298 U.N.T.S. 75-76, CCH Common
pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 184, 298 U.N.T.S. 78, CCH Common
pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 173, 298 U.N.T.S. 75-76, CCH Common
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for valid decisions- and sometimes unanimity. "13 The Commission
decides by simple majority but always as a body with the quorum
as set out in its own rules of procedure;4 1 in some cases other bodies
such as the Assembly have to be consulted.s If the Court should,
as it certainly will, consider these procedural rules as substantial, it
will have to annul upon petition within two months after their
publication, the decisions disregarding these rules of procedure.40
As regards formulation, the decisions of both Council and Commission must state the reasons therefore. This means first that they
must state that the required procedure has been complied with, and
second, that they must contain the relevant facts and considerations on which they are based. It would seem that in the case of
Regulations it will be impracticable to expect the same degree of
detailed reasoning as will be required in the case of administrative
decisions. For the latter, which will mainly be decisions of the
Commission, the Court can surely be expected to follow the practice
which it has set down for the High Authority of the ECSC, namely,
that the decision in order to be valid has to contain the essential
facts which legally justify it and the arguments which led to it in
sufficient detail to enable the Court to exercise judicial review
properly. The Court has expressly stated that the requirement for
giving the reasons falls within the category of conditions which,
like that of jurisdiction over the subject matter, are considered by
the Court on its own motion"

In the third instance, an act may not infringe upon the Treaty or "any
rule of law relating to its application." 49 The same words are used in
Article 33 of the ECSC Treaty where the French text was the only official
42. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 2, art. 143, 29S
Market Rep. ff 6039 (majority requirements).
1, ch. 1, § 2, art. 149, 29S
43. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit.
Market Rep. I 6043 (unanimity requirements).
44. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 3, art. 163, 298
Market Rep. f 60S1.
45. See, e.g., EEC Treaty, pt. 6, art. 235, 29S U.N.T.S. 91,

U.N.T.S. 70, CCH Common
U.N.T.S. 70, CCH Common
U.N.T.S. 73, CCH Common
CCH Common Mfarl:et Rep.

1, ch. 1, § 2, art. 149, 293 U.N.T.S. 70, CCH Common
fT 6377; EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit.
Market Rep. f 6043.
46. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 173, 298 UIN.T.S. 75-76, CCH Common
Market Rep. ff 6117.
1, ch. 2, art. 190, 298 U.N.T.S. 79, CCH Common Market
47. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit.
Rep. ff 61S1.
48.
49.

Nold v. Haute Autorit6, supra note 9, at 114.
EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 173, 298 U.N.T.S. 75, CCH Cemmon
Market Rep. Ul6117 (translation of author from official French text).
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text. ° With respect to the EEC Treaty, the Dutch, French, German and
Italian texts are all of equal validity.5 ' The Dutch text of article 173 is
more restrictive than the other three, as it speaks of infringement of the
Treaty or of any Regulations made for its implementation. There is an
unfortunate difference between the expression "Regulations" for implementation of the Treaty in the Dutch text and "rules of law" in the
three other texts.
In an address which the President of the Court of Justice of the
European Communities, Judge Donner, delivered in 1960 in London, he
said:
What are those rules of law-are the sole regulations in execution of the Treaties
to be understood by this term or are we to suppose that by those words the authors
had in mind the general principles of law, common to the Member States? Those
principles, as evolved by the various domestic administrative tribunals, especially the
French Conseil d'Etat, contain some very interesting principles about the limits of
executive and administrative powers.5 2

Indeed, the French Council of State has repeatedly referred to general
principles of law and in particular to the Declaration of Human Rights
of 1789 in order to quash not only administrative acts, but also
legislative decrees emanating from the Executive by delegated legislation. Mr. Donner himself said in 1953, when he was professor of
administrative law, that "the term infringement of the law must be taken
in a wide sense, namely to embrace not only written rules, but unwritten
rules as well." 53
It is true, that wherever by a treaty stipulation, a State renounces part
of its power, the accepted rules of interpretation of international treaties
demand a restrictive interpretation in cases where there are different
versions. But article 173 has to do with the powers of the Court in controlling those of the Council and Commission, and does not in any way
deal with what power the Member States may or may not have re54
nounced.
With regard to the Treaty of Paris, the Court has in various judgments
relied on general principles of law such as implied powers,55 equality
50. ECSC Treaty, tit. 2, ch. 4, art. 33, 261 U.N.T.S. 167 ("ou toute r~gle de drolt relative
h son application").
51. EEC Treaty, pt. 6, art. 248, 298 U.N.T.S. 94, CCH Common Market Rep. gi6424.
52. Donner, The Court of Justice of the European Communities, in Legal Problems of
the European Economic Community and the European Free Trade Association 66, 70
(1961).
53. Donner, Nederlands Bestuursrecht 249 (1953).
54. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 173, 298 U.N.T.S. 75-76, CCH Common
Market Rep. f16117.
55. F~diration Charbonnire de Belgique v. Haute Autorit6, Cour dc Justice de ]a C.E.C.A.,
July 16, 1956, 2 Rec. de la jurisprudence de ]a Cour 199, at 305; Gouvernement do ]a
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under the law 6 and certainty of the law.57 Indeed, in our opinion, it seems
impossible to interpret a treaty without having recourse to general
principles of law.
The Court sometimes just speaks of general principles; but more often
makes a comparative study of the principles recognized by statutes,
authoritative writers and Court decisions of the Member States, and then
applies those general principles of law which are recognized by all
Member States in common. This reasoning, applied by the Court in cases
which arose under the ECSC Treaty, is strongly supported as regards the
EEC Treaty by article 215, which lays down the rule that the Community shall be liable for torts of its institutions "in accordance with the
general principles common to the laws of Member States ....,,3 However, we feel that the standard of the general principles applied in at
least some Member States should, within the context of article 173 and,
perhaps, even in the context of article 215, be applied by the Community
even if one or more of the Member States do not follow it. Otherwise, the
European standard would be reduced to the lowest common denominator.
A French author has rightly observed that it may be more difficult to
amend the EEC Treaty than a constitution because of the requirement
of unanimous ratification of amendments by the Member States, 9 and
he submits that the Court should, therefore, develop a creative mind.c"
The Court has certainly been correct when it declared that provisions
of the German Constitution for the protection of individual rights were
not in themselves applicable to its jurisdiction. But it would be a very
doubtful step to conclude from this that only such general principles known
to national legal systems were admissible as have found recognition in all
Member States. The development of Community law would be held back
if the Court could never go beyond the development common to all
Member States. I am not blind to the limitation of the doctrine of
implied powers (in interpreting the Treaty) which article 2351 ordains
by specifically reserving the use of implied powers to the Council acting
unanimously upon proposals of the Commission. But we should nonetheless insist that the Court should not hesitate to draw on worthwhile
R6publique Italienne v. Haute Autorit, Cour de Justice de la C.E.C.A., July 15, 19LO,
6 Rec. de la jurisprudence de la Cour 663, 6S8.
56. Groupement des Hauts Fourneaux v. Haute Autorit6, Cour de Justice de 1a
C.E.C.A., June 21, 1958, 4 Rec. de la jurisprudence de la Cour 223, 247.
57. Socit, Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Geus v. Bosch, Cour de Justice de Ia C.E.C.A.,
April 6, 1962, 7 Rec. de la jurisprudence de la Cour, 89, 104, CCH Common Market Rep.

ff S003.
58.
59.
60.
61.

EEC Treaty, pt. 6, art. 215, 298 U.N.T.S. 86, CCH Common Market Rep. 5 6313.
EEC Treaty, pt. 6, art. 236, 298 U.N.TS. 91, CCH Common Market Rep. U 6381.
Jeantet, Jurisclasseur de Droit International, fascicule 161-C, le cabler, 3 (1960).
EEC Treaty, pt. 6, art. 235, 298 U.N.T.S. 91, CCH Common Market Rep. E 6377.
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principles even if they are not accepted in all Member States, where these
principles enable the Court to maintain individual liberties in the face of
administrative powers far surpassing those customary in individual States.
We must not forget that the Preamble to the Treaty concludes with the
solemn affirmation that the contracting parties agree by this pooling of
their economic potential to preserve and "to strengthen the safeguards
For who will be the guardian of individual
of peace and liberty .....
liberties if not the Court? Neither the Parliaments of the six Member
States nor the Assembly of the Community need to ratify the legislative
acts of the Council. Meeting at Strasbourg, under the ambitious name of
European Parliamentary Assembly, the representatives of the people
have only advisory powers in the law-making process.0 3 They must be
consulted in cases where important legislation is proposed by the Commission to the Council.64 However, if they disapprove of such proposals,
the Commission is in no way bound to alter them, and the Council is
not free to choose between the proposals of the Commission and those
of the Assembly, i.e., unless the Council is unanimous it cannot disregard
the proposals of the Commission and cannot take into account the resolutions taken by the Assembly after public debate.0 5 In all democratic
countries, and not only in the common-law world, it has been the traditional function of the parliament and the courts to protect the liberties
of the individual against encroachment by the government; in the European Communities the full responsibility for guarding these liberties is
enshrined in the Court of Justice. It is submitted that an infringement of
individual liberties which is not sanctioned by the Treaty, even if not
clearly ultra vires in light of the Treaty, is nevertheless a violation of
general principles of law forming an intrinsic part of the Treaty.
The fourth ground for quashing legislative and administrative decisions is the abuse of power.0 6 Actually the term used is the French term,
ditournement de pouvoir, or misdirection of power, found both in Article
33 of the ECSC and in Article 173 of the EEC Treaty. This is a term
of art in French law which denotes the use by an administrative authority
of its powers for purposes other than those for which they were conferred. The Court adopted this definition in its early decisions on Article
62.

EEC Treaty, 298 U.N.T.S.

14, CCH Common Market Rep. f1111 (Preamble).

1, ch. 1, § 1, art. 137, 298 U.N.T.S. 67, CCH Common Market
63. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit.
Rep. U16001.
64. See note 45 supra.
65. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 2, art. 149, 298 U.N.T.S. 70, CCH Common
Market Rep. U]6043.
66. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 173, 298 UXN.T.S. 75, CCH Common
Market Rep. fT6117.
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33 of the ECSC Treaty.0 7 The German text of article 33 would seem to

go further in speaking of abuse of discretionary power using Ermesscnsmissbrauchs, a technical term in German administrative law which has
entered into the official text of the EEC Treaty.r9 The French definition
requires that the administrative authority should have intended to exercise its power beyond the purpose in view of which it was granted,
whereas in the German definition no such intention needs to be proved,
since the mere fact of a wrong application of power is sufficient. The
Court, up to now, has not gone beyond the narrower French interpretation, with the result that not a single decision has so far been quashed
on this ground. Most decisions of the Court reported up to now were
based on the ECSC Treaty for which the French text is the only authentic source. Under the EEC Treaty where all four languages are of
equal value, there seems to be no reason why the Court should not reconsider its approach and, in lieu of the narrower French term, detourncmc'nt
de pouvoir, which embraces only subjective abuse of power, accept the
somewhat wider term of subjective and objective abuse which seems to
be supported both by the German and Dutch texts. Such a wider interpretation would be in conformity with a general trend in European administrative law which demands that in view of the ever increasing
administrative activity of the State, the scope of judicial review be
extended.
Article 173 of the EEC Treaty deals with the power of the Court to
quash legislative or administrative acts of the Council or Commission,
and it should, perhaps, be added all other legally relevant acts; in particular, directives addressed by the Council to the Member States.
Article 175c' of the Treaty gives to the institutions of the Community,
to the Member States and to individual persons or corporations a remedy
before the Court if either the Council or Commission fail to act in cases
where it would be their duty under the Treaty to do so, and where a
period of two months has elapsed since the petitioner requested the authority to act. Although article 175 speaks only of violation of the
Treaty, it is clear that, as in article 173, a violation of any rules of law,
including general principles and regulations, will be sufficient.
It is essential to the good functioning of the Common Market that the
Treaty, itself, and the law of the Community should be uniformly interpreted and applied throughout the six Member States. Theoretically, this
67. F d ration Charbonniare de Belgique v. Haute AutoritO, Cour de Justice de la
C.E.CA., July 16, 1956, 2 Rec. de la jurisprudence de ]a Cour 199, 309-10.
68. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 173, 293 U.N.T.S. 75-76, CCH Common
Market Rep. 6117 (German text).
69. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, fit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 175, 298 U. N.T.S. 76, CCH Common Market
Rep. 11
6124.
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could have been achieved in a manner similar to federal states, by granting an appeal from the court of last resort of each country to the Court
of the European Communities with respect to all decisions involving
Community law. But such a procedure would have meant a clear submission of the highest national courts to the European Court of Luxembourg. It was not desirable for political reasons to establish such a
hierarchy. Therefore, article 17770 provides that whenever a national
court of a Member State must base its judgment on a preliminary decision either about the interpretation of the Treaty or about the validity
and interpretation of acts of the institutions of the Community, a lower
court may, and the national court of last resort must, request the Court
of the European Communities
to give a ruling which the national court
71
will have to follow.

In the United States the courts of appeal have power to certify to the
Supreme Court questions of law concerning which they desire the instructions of that Court for their own decision. In the Common Market, such
certification becomes compulsory for any court of last resort needing a
decision on questions of Community law. But the European Court of
Justice is not at liberty to take the whole procedure in its own hands for
final decision such as the United States Supreme Court may do. Its
function is limited to giving a ruling upon which the case will be resumed
in the national court. If this obligation is taken literally and with the
extension of Community law in the antitrust field and other fields, the
Luxembourg Court may within a few years be overwhelmed with cases
"certified up." When this stage is reached, the national courts of last
resort ought to be permitted to follow precedents contained in earlier
rulings of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, on the
condition that none of the parties to the lawsuit raise an objection. You
will realize that if such a rule were adopted, an objection raised by a
party would in effect amount to an appeal against a decision of the
highest national court to apply the precedent.
Turning to the role of the Court in the antitrust structure, it is apparent that it will have to interpret articles 8572 and 8678 of the Treaty
as well as the Regulations implementing these articles. You will recall
that a claimant, if he is of the opinion that a provision contained in a
Regulation (on the strength of which measures are being applied against
70. EEC
Market Rep.
71. Ibid.
72. EEC
Market Rep.
73. EEC
Market Rep.

Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 177, 298 U.N.T.S. 76-77, CCH Common
§ 6131.
Treaty, pt. 3, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 1, art. 85, 298 U.N.T.S. 47-48, CCII Common
112005, 2031, 2051.
Treaty, pt. 3, fit. 1, ch. 1, § 1, art. 86, 298 U.N.T.S. 48-49, CCH Common
ff 2101.
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him) infringes upon the Treaty, may question its validity upon any of
the four grounds for annulment contained in article 173.11
Of the three ways in which a private person or a corporation (hereinafter referred to as "enterprises") may invoke the help of the Court,
the remedy provided in article 17571 against unlawful inactivity of Council or Commission is likely to play only a minor role. A claim lies only
if the Commission was clearly bound to act. The claim would probably
not be available upon a request to obtain an exemption under section 3
of article 8571 for a restrictive agreement reported to the Commission.
The reporting parties may be greatly interested in a speedy decision,
but since no time limit is placed on the Commission for rendering its
decision, the parties will only be able to go to Court if the delay of the
Commission in making a decision is quite unreasonable. It would be
difficult to say that the failure to make a decision is unlawful as long as
the Commission can justify the delay on reasonable grounds, for instance
the need for further investigation.
For enterprises, the most important action before the Court is likely
to be under article 17377 against a decision of the Commission with which
they disagree. The petitioners may attack the Commission's decision addressed to them or concerning them on any of the four grounds of invalidity mentioned in article 173. As regards the first ground, lack of
jurisdiction, you and I, who live in a federal state, will easily recognize,
when reading section I of article 85 7s and article 86,70 that they
contain a provision restricting the competence of the EEC to a clearly
74. See note 6S supra.
75. See note 69 supra.
76. EEC Treaty, pt. 3, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 1, art. 85(3), 293 UN.T.S. 43, CCH Common
Market Rep. UI2051.
77. See note 6S supra.
78. Article S5(1) provides: "The follovig shall be deemed to be incompatible vwith
the Common Market and shall hereby be prohibited: any agrcements between enterpriszs,
any decisions by associations of enterprises and any concerted practices which are likely to
affect trade between the lember States and which have as their object or result the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the Common Market, in particu!ar
those consisting in: (a) the direct or indirect fixing of purchase or selling prices or of any

other trading conditions; (b) the limitaton or control of production, markets, technical
development or investment; (c) market-sharing or the sharing of sources of supply; (d) the
application to parties to transactions of unequal terms in respect of equivalent supplies,
thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage; or (e) the subjecting of the conclusion
of a contract to the acceptance by a party of additional supplies which, either by their
nature or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such
contract." EEC Treaty, pt. 3, fit. 1, ch. 1, § 1, art. 85, 293 UTIN.T.S. 47-43, CCH Common
Market Rep. 2005.
79. EEC Treaty, pt. 3, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 1, art. S6, 293 UX.T.S. 48-49, CCH Common
Market Rep. fI 2101.
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defined set of circumstances. Both paragraphs contain a provision
showing that they apply to restrictive practices only if trade between
Member States is liable to be adversely affected. This means that such
restrictive practices as are not apt to have an adverse affect upon trade
between Member States are of no concern to the legislative and executive
organs of the Community. They lie outside their scope of action. Indeed,
only unreasonable restraints of competition are apt to cause an adverse
effect upon trade, and it is submitted that all restraints on competition
which are acceptable, within the meaning of the rule of reason, should
therefore be deemed outside the jurisdiction of the European Communities. Consequently, the Court of Justice has to disallow the competence
of the Commission to deal with such restrictive practices as in the
opinion of the Court are not unreasonable and, therefore, incapable of
adversely affecting trade between Member States. The interpretation
submitted here has, of course, not yet been tested before the Court. But
it is apparent that unless the rule of reason is adopted, the antitrust laws
of the Common Market will fail in their primary objects. Unless these
laws command the confidence and respect of the governed, which in this
case means the industrial and commercial community, they cannot hope
to succeed. The purpose of articles 85 and 86 is to set a new standard
for industry and commerce which bears in mind the public interest to
an extent seldom previously achieved. This cannot be done by a number
of doctrinaire rules; it demands a realistic and reasonable approach. s0
Under the second ground, substantial disregard of essential formalities,"' the Court will have to determine whether a decision of the Commission has been reached under the prescribed procedure and whether
it is justified by the stated reasons. The provisions in Regulation 1782
regarding the procedure for giving negative clearance to a submitted
agreement, for granting or denying an exemption under section 3 of
article 85 to a reported agreement, for any decision under article 86, for
the imposition of sanctions and other related problems are extremely
scanty.
In this respect article 19 of Regulation 1713 provides that before
rendering a decision the Commission has to give to the enterprises or
associations of enterprises concerned an opportunity to express their
views on objections which the Commission wishes to advance. It is not
stated whether an oral hearing has to be granted by the Commission.
80. The author's thoughts about the rule of reason under article 85 are further developed in an article published in the forthcoming issue of the American Journal of Comparative Law. - Am. J. Comp. L. - (1963).
81. See note 68 supra.
82. See, e.g., articles 2 and 5 of Regulation 17. CCH Common Market Rep. 711 2411, 2441.
83. CCH Common Market Rep. ff 2581.
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The Commission may also decide to hear third parties, and where it
proposes to grant negative clearance or an exemption under section 3
of article 85, it has to publish beforehand the main contents of the claim
for clearance or exemption, and it must invite third parties to express
their views if they wish.
While the right of the directly aggrieved enterprises to express their
point of view is dealt with in one single sentence, the Council took more
care, in the six paragraphs of article 10 of Regulation 17,14 to establish
rules for the consultation of Member States upon any decisions. If no
further Regulations ensuring the right of the parties to impartial procedure were issued, it would be the duty of the Court of Justice to safeguard the observance of the general principles of law regarding judicial
or quasi-judicial decisions. It is obvious that the Commission, when
making the decisions referred to above, is acting partly as prosecutor
and partly as judge. It seems, therefore, essential for the observance of
the rule of law that all documents and other evidence used by agents of
the Commission in their capacity as investigators or prosecutors should
be made available to the party concerned, that the party be present or
represented when witnesses are heard and that it may in writing and
orally present its observations-if not to the Commission, at least to an
agent or agency charged by the Commission to prepare the decision upon
an impartial hearing of both sides.
If these essentials of rendering justice were not complied with, the
Court of Justice would have to quash the decision made by the Commission for lack of proper proceduref 5 In accordance with existing
practice, the Court would also have to annul for lack of substantial form,
any decision which did not in its explanation clearly indicate the facts and
circumstances taken into account by the Commission and their impact
on the decision.
As regards the third ground of annulment, violation of the Treaty or
of any rule of law relative to its implementation,"" the Court will have to
examine the findings of the Commission as far as the application of legal
rules and principles is involved. This necessarily implies an examination
of the factual situation and evidence considered, or perhaps wrongfully
not considered, by the Commission in its findings.
Article 33 of the ECSC Treaty"7 had limited the right of the Court to
evaluate the situation resulting from economic facts and circumstances,
in the light of which the High Authority reached its decision, to the
34.
S5.

CCH Common Market Rep. U2491.
EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 173, 29S UN.T.S. 75-76, CCH Common

Market Rep. ff 6117.

86.

See note S5 supra.

87. ECSC Treaty, tit. 2, ch. 4, art. 33, 261 U.N.T.S. 167.
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case of a patent disregard of the Treaty or rules of law. Although this
limitation on the Court is not expressed in the EEC Treaty, various
authors hold that it also applies because in their view factual evaluation
is not part of judicial review as such.88 We think that this theory is wrong,
particularly in the antitrust field, where the correct evaluation of economic facts and circumstances is of basic importance. It would be very
hard for the Court to state whether the law has been properly applied
without evaluating the underlying economic facts.
With regard to the fourth ground, abuse of power, 89 judicial review
will presumably have a limited scope if the present practice is maintained,
according to which the Court interferes with the legitimate power of the
executive of the Community only if its use was arbitrary or outside its
prescribed function. Since in the antitrust field the principles laid down
by law are very uncertain and vague, the Court might claim for itself
the control of the use of the Commission's power under the third ground,
i.e., violation of the Treaty or of any rule of law relative to its implementation when interpreting these vague principles of antitrust law. The
antitrust lawyer would hope that in this way the Court might control
the appropriateness of the decisions made by the Commission, for in
antitrust matters it seems an attempt at the impossible to separate the
legal evaluation from the factual evaluation of a concrete economic
situation.
The problem of scope of jurisdiction does not arise in regard to the
fines and penalties which the Commission may impose according to
articles 15 and 16 of Regulation 1 7.9 0 Availing itself of a power given to
the Commission by article 17291 of the Treaty, the Council decreed in
article 17 of Regulation 1792 that the Court of Justice shall have full
jurisdiction to review any fines and penalties imposed by the Commission. This means that the Court may review the decision of the Commission on its merits and may cancel, reduce or (within the limits prescribed in the Regulation) increase the fine or the penalty imposed.
Prima facie, it appears that the Council has respected that fundamental
principle of law that fines or penalties imposed by an administrative
authority should be subject to full review by an independent tribunal.
But unfortunately the Council has only partly observed that rule. The
88. Jeantet, op. cit. supra note 60, 2e cahier, n. 74; Catalano, Manuale di Diritto delle
Communith Europee 80 (1962).
89. See note 85 supra.
90. CCH Common Market Rep. ItIT
2541, 2551.
91. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 172, 298 U.N.T.S. 75, CCH Common
Market Rep. It 6114.
92. CCH Common Market Rep. fI2561.
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rule demands that the Court be free to examine all the facts and evidence
which led to the imposition of a sanction. It is to be presumed that in
many cases the Commission will only impose a sanction if a prior administrative decision was infringed by the party to which it was addressed. In this case, the Court can only fully evaluate all the facts
which led to the imposition of a sanction if it is free to examine, without
any restrictions, the prior administrative decision on which the sanction
is based. But this is not provided for in article 17 of Regulation 17P 3
Some authors believe that the right of the Court to examine the prior
decision is implied. However, in view of the fact that the Court, when
interpreting the provisions of Article 36 of the ECSC Treaty,"' which
corresponds exactly to article 17 of Regulation 17, has declared that no
such implication is permitted, the opinion of the authors mentioned has
not much chance of acceptance by the Court.
The limitation on the Court which results from Regulation 17 is unsatisfactory. Under article 87 of the Treaty,0 the Council has, with
respect to the implementatibn of articles 85 and 86, to define the respective powers of the Commission and the Court. The Council would therefore in our view be free, in a future regulation, to give to the Court full
jurisdiction not only to examine the prior decisions which led to a sanction-this authority is already contained in article 172 0 0-- but also full
jurisdiction in the judicial review of all decisions of the Commission
under articles 85 and 86. This would be most desirable.
We now come to the last point-the request of a national court for
guidance from the European Court on the interpretation of the Treaty
or other Community law which leads to a ruling according to article 177
of the Treaty. 7 The purpose of this procedure, as we have seen, is the
clarification and uniform application of Community law. In antitrust
matters, where points of fact and points of law are always closely interrelated, this method is not very satisfactory. Without appreciating or
even knowing all the facts, the Court will necessarily be led to give
cryptic answers. In the only case under articles 85 and 86 which the
Court of Justice has so far decided, the Bosch decision,0 3 the Court of
93. Article 17 of Regulation 17 merely gives the Court full jurisdiction to review decdsions of the Commission which impose a fine or penalty. Ibid.
94. ECSC Treaty, tit. 2, ch. 4, art. 36, 261 U.N.T.S. 169.
95. EEC Treaty, pt. 3, tit. 1, ch. 1, § 1, art. 87, 293 U.N.TS. 49, CCH Common
Market Rep. r 2201.
96. See note 91 supra.
97. EEC Treaty, pt. 5, fit. 1, ch. 1, § 4, art. 177, 29S U.N.T.S. 76-77, CCH Common
Market Rep. TI6131.
93. Socit Kledingverkoopbedrijf de Geus v. Bosch, Cour de Justice de la C.E.C.A.,
April 6, 1962, 7 Rec. de la jurisprudence de la Cour 89, CCH Common Market Rep. U C003.
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Appeal of The Hague desired to know whether the prohibition on export,
which the Bosch Corporation in Germany had stipulated in its contracts
with its exclusive dealers, had become void under Article 85 of the EEC
Treaty. In its ruling, the Luxembourg Court gave the following answer:
[T]his question cannot be considered as purely a question of interpretation of the
Treaty, because [the full text of the contract] . . . in which the interdiction was
stipulated was not communicated to the Court and therefore a decision on that point
would not be possible without prior investigation; that such investigation is not
within the power of the Court of Justice when it decides according to art. 177 of the
Treaty; that under this condition, the Court must limit itself to state that it is not
excluded that the prohibition to export about which the Court of Appeal was enquiring
may come under the definition of art. 85 § 1.99

As you see, the answer of the Court was neither yes nor no, because it
did not have knowledge of the underlying facts. This example shows
again how necessary it is not to limit the Court under article 173100 in
the evaluation of facts. In the procedure for ruling under article 177,01
the national courts ought to give to the European Court of Justice all the
facts of the case, otherwise the rulings given by it may share the proverbial characteristics of the Delphic Oracle. This is an unfortunate
result, and I am glad to say that in the cases now under consideration
by the Court it has obtained the records of the facts, so that it will be in
a position to give a more useful judgment.
With this I hope to have given you a short and not too baffling survey
of the role of the Court of the European Communities in the antitrust
structure. We arrive at the conclusion that the Court has an important
part to play in the interpretation and application of the antitrust rules
of the Common Market. We have seen that its powers are sometimes
limited by the fact that it is mainly a Court of judicial review of legislative and quasi-judicial decisions of an administrative authority. It possesses withal ample powers to ensure law and justice if, in living up to
its responsibility, it uses its powers with courage and imagination.
99. Id. at 106, CCH Common Market Rep. ff 8003, at 6538. (Translation is that of
author.)
100. See note 85 supra.
101. See note 97 supra.

